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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Judicial Watch, Inc. (“Judicial Watch”) is a not-for-profit, public interest
organization that has no parent company and no publically-held corporation has a
10% or greater ownership interest in Judicial Watch.
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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES,
RULING, AND RELATED CASES
Parties, Intervenors and Amici:
The Parties, Intervenors and Amici appearing in the lower court and in this
appeal are listed in the Brief for the Appellant.

Ruling Under Review:
The ruling under review in this appeal is the February 22, 2011 Order of The
Honorable Gladys Kessler. The Memorandum Opinion accompanying this Order
is reported at Mead v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).

Related Cases:
There are no other associated cases in this judicial circuit. There exist,
however, numerous cases in other judicial circuits regarding the present issues here.
Four of those cases have issued substantive rulings on the issue presented here,
which include Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D.
Mich. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2010); Liberty Univ., Inc. v.
Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010), appeal filed,
No. 10-2347 (4th Cir. Dec. 1, 2010); Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), appeal filed, No. 11-1057 (4th Cir. Jan. 18,
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2011); and State of Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Dep=t of Health and
Human Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fla. 2011), appeal filed, No.
11-11021 (11th Cir. Mar. 8, 2011).
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GLOSSARY
AAA

Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938

CCPA

Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968

CRA

Civil Rights Act of 1964

CSA

Controlled Substances Act of 1970

PPACA

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010

SMCRA

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Founded in 1994, Judicial Watch is a non-profit, non-partisan, public interest
organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. that seeks to promote
accountability, transparency and integrity in government and fidelity to the rule of
law. In furtherance of these goals, Judicial Watch regularly monitors on-going
litigation, files amicus curiae briefs, and prosecutes lawsuits on matters that it
believes are of public importance. The case at issue raises important questions of
constitutional interpretation and the proper balance of power between the several
states and the federal government. Specifically, Judicial Watch has undertaken
extensive research on whether an individual who simply does not purchase health
insurance has performed an activity that Congress may properly regulate under its
commerce power. Because it believes that this question alone resolves the matter
before this Court, it is necessary for Judicial Watch to file its brief separately from
other participating amici curiae.
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
Furthermore, no person other than Amicus Curiae, its members, or its counsel
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
1
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the Supreme Court‟s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress may
regulate activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
Fundamentally at issue before this Court is whether Section 1501 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act regulates an activity. Based on a review of
United States Supreme Court precedent as well as the plain meaning of the term
“activity”, Congress exceeded its authority by regulating an individual who simply
does not purchase health insurance.
ARGUMENT
I.

Introduction
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as
amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (hereafter “PPACA”). Before day‟s end, lawsuits
were filed in federal courts all across the United States challenging the
constitutionality of the PPACA. By current count, more than 20 lawsuits have been
filed by individuals, organizations and the Attorneys General or Governors of 26
states. Chief among the offending provisions is ' 1501, entitled “Requirement to
Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage.” See PPACA § 1501 (adding 26 U.S.C. §
2
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5000A) (hereafter “individual mandate”).
Section 1501 requires individuals, with certain limited exceptions, “for each
month beginning after 2013 [to] ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential
coverage for such month.” 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a). The law requires that
individuals report on their federal individual income tax returns the months of the
year in which they had such coverage. If an individual fails to obtain such
minimum essential coverage, he or she must include with their annual federal tax
payment a “shared responsibility payment,” which is a fixed dollar amount penalty
calculated under the PPACA. Id. at §§ 5000A(b), (c).
The various plaintiffs, including Appellants, argue that the individual
mandate and penalty exceed Congress= authority under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3. Currently, two United
States District Courts have declared that the provision is unconstitutional as ultra
vires of Congress‟ Commerce Clause power.1 Three other United States District

1

See Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D.
Va. 2010), appeal filed, No. 11-1057 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2011) and State of Florida ex
rel. Bondi v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fla. 2011), appeal filed, No. 11-11021 (11th Cir. Mar. 8, 2011).
3
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Courts, including the District Court below, have found the opposite.2
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art I, ' 8, cl. 3. Relevant here is what is commonly
referred to as the “Interstate Commerce Clause” portion of this grant of power: “To
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” The exact meaning of this
clause has sparked wide debate and many different court interpretations within
different federal circuits and the United States Supreme Court. The High Court has
addressed this issue many times since the days of Chief Justice Marshall and many
times it has expanded and contracted the meaning of this clause.
Distilling its earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence into a workable rule of
law, the Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) explained that
Congress may regulate only three broad categories of activity under its commerce
power: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities,” and (3)
2

See Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich.
2010), appeal filed, No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2010); Liberty Univ., Inc. v.
Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010), appeal filed,
No. 10-2347 (4th Cir. Dec. 1, 2010); and Mead v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18592 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).
4

USCA Case #11-5047

Document #1309420

Filed: 05/23/2011

Page 15 of 28

“those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” (citations omitted); see also
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-277 (1981); and United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-609 (2000). It is this third category that Appellees
argue grants them the authority to require individuals to purchase health insurance or
else pay a penalty. The question, thus, presented for this Court=s determination, is
whether an individual who does not purchase health insurance has performed an
activity.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. Or, quite simply, is not purchasing health

insurance an activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power? A
review of United States Supreme Court precedent where statutes regulating
“activity” were held to be constitutional demonstrates that the answer is no.
II.

The Supreme Court=s Definition of AActivity@
In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), Filburn, a farmer who actively

engaged in the over-cultivation of wheat, was assessed a penalty for growing more
than his allotted amount of wheat under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
(hereafter “AAA”) (7 U.S.C. § 1281, et seq.). Filburn brought suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that the wheat marketing quota provisions of the AAA were
unconstitutional because, as he argued, Congress did not have the power to regulate
5
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his excess wheat production that he used for home consumption and not for sale.
Yet the Court found that, although Filburn‟s wheat consumption alone would only
have a minimal impact on the market, when combined with others similarly situated,
the impact would be substantial on interstate commerce. Id. at 127-28. As a
result, the Court upheld the AAA as a constitutional exercise of Congress‟
commerce power. Most courts and commentators agree that the holding in
Wickard is the Court‟s most expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (Wickard is “perhaps the most far reaching example
of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.”). It therefore can be seen
as the outermost reach of the Commerce Clause.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), a corporate
businessman who actively engaged in the discriminatory operation of a motel
brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the prohibition of racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation under Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (hereafter “CRA”) (42 U.S.C § 2000a, et seq.) exceeded Congress‟
powers under the Commerce Clause. The Court examined Title II and its
legislative history and determined that it was a constitutional exercise of Congress‟
commerce power because it was “carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and
substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people.” 379 U.S. at 250,
6
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257. Such enterprises that had an effect on interstate commerce were the
discriminatory operations of hotels and motels. The Court concluded that the
prohibitory provisions of Title II could constitutionally be applied to the hotel
proprietor=s discriminatory activities because the undisputed facts revealed that he
solicited and received patronage from interstate travelers. Id. at 243, 249-50. His
actions of discriminatorily operating the hotels and motels were the aim of the CRA.
Similarly, in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), several
businesspersons who actively engaged in the discriminatory operation of a
restaurant brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the prohibition of racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation under Title II of the CRA
exceeded Congress‟ powers under the Commerce Clause. Once again, the Court
held that Title II was a constitutional exercise of Congress‟ commerce power
because its application was limited to only a restaurant that “serves or offers to serve
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves . . . has moved
in commerce.” Id. at 298, 304. The activity therefore in this instance was the
discriminatory operation of restaurants. In sum, the prohibitory provisions of Title
II could constitutionally be applied to the restaurant proprietors‟ discriminatory
activities because the undisputed facts revealed that they purchased a substantial
portion of their food and inventory from sources engaged in interstate commerce.
7
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Id. at 296-97, 304. The restaurant proprietors, in other words, were active
participants in interstate commerce as purchasers.
In Perez, 402 U.S. 146, Perez, an individual who actively engaged in
loan-sharking, sought review of his conviction under Title II of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act of 1968 (hereafter “CCPA”) (18 U.S.C. § 891, et seq.). Perez argued
that Congress lacked the authority to enact the provision under its commerce power
because his alleged activities were entirely intrastate. The Court however held that
it was a constitutional exercise of Congress‟ commerce power because Perez‟s
activity of extortionate credit transactions, although purely intrastate, directly
affected interstate and foreign commerce as a component of organized crime, an
interstate enterprise. 402 U.S. at 154, 156. The Court, thus, upheld the petitioner=s
conviction as he was “clearly a member of the class which engages in „extortionate
credit transactions.‟” Id. at 153.
In Hodel, 452 U.S. 264, several businesses, associations, and individuals who
were actively engaged in surface coal mining operations filed suit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against various provisions of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (hereafter “SMCRA”) (30 U.S.C. ' 1201, et
seq.). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Congress lacked the authority to enact
provisions of the SMCRA that regulated the use of private lands within the borders
8
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of the specific states. After examining the SMCRA and its legislative history, the
Court held that the SMCRA was a constitutional exercise of Congress= commerce
power because surface coal mining directly affects interstate commerce. 452 U.S.
at 280-81. Specifically, the Court rejected the plaintiffs‟= argument that coal
mining is a purely local activity with no effect on interstate commerce since coal, as
a commodity, moves in interstate commerce and the Court has long held that it was
within Congress= power to regulate the conditions under which goods shipped in
interstate commerce are produced. Id. at 281.
Finally, in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005), two individuals who
actively cultivated and used physician-recommended marijuana brought suit seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970 (hereafter “CSA”) (U.S.C. § 801, et seq.) to the extent that it
prevented them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana for their
personal medical use. The plaintiffs argued that Congress was without power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate their conduct as the marijuana they
cultivated, possessed, and used was entirely produced and consumed locally.
Looking to precedent, the Court disagreed: “Wickard thus establishes that Congress
can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself “commercial,” in that it is not
produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would
9
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undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.” 545 U.S. at 18.
The Court therefore held that the CSA was a constitutional exercise of Congress‟
commerce power because the activity that was sought to be regulated B possessing,
obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana B directly affects interstate commerce. Id. at
18-20.
III.

There Exists No “Activity” Subject to the Commerce Clause in This Case.
The above cases clearly demonstrate that the Supreme Court requires

something more than mere passivity for Congress to exercise its commerce power.
Said another way, the Supreme Court‟s Commerce Clause jurisprudence requires
that Congress regulate an activity, as opposed to not engaging in an activity. In
Wickard, the plaintiff grew wheat; in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the plaintiff operated a
hotel; in McClung, the plaintiffs operated a restaurant; in Perez, the plaintiff
engaged in loan-sharking; in Hodel, the plaintiffs engaged in surface coal mining;
and in Raich, the plaintiffs cultivated, possessed, and used marijuana. Indeed, in
each of these instances and in every Supreme Court case decided thus far under the
third category delineated in Lopez, the legislation regulated some form of activity.3

3

In addition to the aforementioned cases, see also, e.g., Coronado Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (prevented coal manufacturing and
production); Int=l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934)
(conspired to prevent the delivery of live poultry through violence and intimidation);
10
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In this case, the District Court found that an individual who does not purchase
health insurance performs an activity and, thus, may be regulated by Congress under
the Commerce Clause. Mead, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *55, 56. Yet, the
District Court‟s position that an individual who does not purchase health insurance
performs an activity is contradicted by the common meaning of “activity.” The
verb to be “active,” the root word of “activity,” is defined by Merriam-Webster=s
Dictionary of Law as “characterized or accomplished by action or effort.”

Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (traded futures in grain); Houston, E. &
W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (established railroad carrier
rates); Railroad Com. of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922)
(established railroad carrier rates); United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70 (1933)
(established railroad carrier rates); Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1 (1934)
(established railroad carrier rates); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20
(1911) (operated a railroad); Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com.,
221 U.S. 612 (1911) (operated a railroad); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (manufactured iron and steel); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601
(1939) (operated a factory that processed garments); Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (consolidated stock, property and franchise of
competitor insolvent railroad); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905)
(bought, slaughtered, processed, and sold live stock); United States v. Patten, 226
U.S. 525 (1913) (purchased cotton for future delivery); C. E. Stevens Co. v. Foster &
Kleiser Co., 311 U.S. 255 (1940) (conspired to create a monopoly in the local bill
posting business); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (state employer
instituted pay raises); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942)
(produced and sold milk); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(manufactured and shipped goods); A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517
(1942) (produced and stored goods for commerce); and Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (operated refineries who
conspired to fix prices).
11
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Merriam-Webster=s Dictionary of Law (1996). Common sense alone compels the
conclusion that an individual who does not purchase health insurance has not taken
an action or exerted effort. The individual does not even need to take a “mental
action.” The individual does not need to make a decision not to purchase health
insurance; the individual simply will not purchase health insurance. Since
Congress has regulated this passivity, Congress has overstepped the Commerce
Clause=s boundaries in attempting to regulate Appellants. Indeed, it seems that
Congress has put the cart before the horse. In an effort to regulate Appellants,
Congress is attempting to compel them into action through the PPACA.
The drafters of the Constitution anticipated power grabs similar to the power
grab accomplished by Congress when it passed the PPACA. Therefore, the drafters
established “a Federal Government of limited powers.‟” New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457
(1991)). In this regard, James Madison, the father of the Constitution, once wrote:
The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which
are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite. . . . The powers reserved to the several States
will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.

12
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The Federalist No. 45, pp 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Said more plainly,
Congress must only exercise those powers expressly granted to it and no more. In
this case, Congress has clearly overstepped the boundaries established by law.
A worthwhile analogy to consider is the concept of personal jurisdiction. Courts in
a state can exercise jurisdiction over a party located outside the state only so long as
the party has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the State seeking to exercise its
jurisdiction. Int=l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). When an
individual has no “minimum contacts” with a forum State, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits that State from acting against that
individual. Id. Personal jurisdiction cannot be created by the unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a nonresident. Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958). “The application of that rule will vary with the nature and
quality of the defendant=s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its
laws.” Id.
Likewise, the Commerce Clause requires that at a minimum there be some
economic act by which an individual purposefully subjects himself or herself to
regulation. As demonstrated, the Commerce Clause requires something more than
13
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mere existing as a living, breathing human being. Nor is Congress‟ unilateral
legislative act sufficient to grant it power over an individual who has not engaged in
any activity. As stated before, Congress has put the cart before the horse. Under
the guise of its Commerce Clause authority, Congress is requiring individuals to
purchase health insurance at government approved prices and quantities.
Recognizing the weak underpinnings of its conclusion that those who do
nothing are engaging in “activity,” the District Court attempted to bolster its
argument by reasoning that Congress may regulate all individuals today because
someday in the future everyone will actively seek medical treatment, which will
have an effect on interstate commerce. Mead, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at
*56-61. More specifically, the District Court reasoned that: (1) everyone will get
sick, (2) and seek out medical treatment, (3) and possibly require an extended stay in
a health care facility (4) that they cannot afford (5) for which family members or
other charitable organizations will not cover, (6) and health care providers will have
to cover, (7) which will result in higher health care costs for everyone. Id. Despite
the obvious factual problems with this argument, i.e., some of the plaintiffs have
sworn under oath that they will never seek medical treatment as it is adverse to their
faith and/or nontraditional, homeopathic methods, the Supreme Court rejected in
Lopez the argument that Congress may regulate activity based solely on the effect
14
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that it may have on interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences. 514
U.S. at 563-567 (Court rejected as too attenuated the Government=s argument that
firearm possession in school zones could result in violent crime which in turn could
adversely affect the national economy.). The Court called it “pil[ing] inference
upon inference.” Id. at 567. The Court proclaimed that the Constitution does not
tolerate reasoning that would “convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.” Id. “[I]f we
were to accept [such] arguments,” the Court reasoned, “we are hard pressed to posit
any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.” Id. at
564; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-616 (Court again rejected government‟s
remote chain of inferences to declare unconstitutional as exceeding Congress‟
commerce power § 40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Judicial Watch respectfully advocates that the
Court reverse the lower court‟s ruling and hold that The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (2010), is unconstitutional.
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